This study will attempt to define precisely the nature of the differences between the United States and the FRG with respect to a particular set of issues arising out of the policy of "Defense and Detente," which is intended to insure peace and security in Europe. More importantly, it will also try to uncover the reasons for those differences, in order to see whether, to what extent, and by what means the policies of the two countries can be brought closer together. In short, this study is an attempt at policy prescription, based on an analysis of factors influencing previous policies and programs.
ABSTRACTNATO may be confronting a crisis over the cruise missiles. Some allies may seek longer‐range, nuclear‐armed missile which could enable them to strike at Soviet MR/IRBMs and at other targets inside the USSR; others (along with many Americans) aim at restricting both the range and the missions of cruise missiles. The first option could jeopardize detente, inhibit further progress in SALT and conceivably weaken American control over the uses of nuclear weapons in time of war. The second could cause strains between the United States and its European allies. The best policy would seem to be to (1) delay any decision on cruise missile development and deployment in Europe; (2) seek a two‐year freeze on all deployment of new nuclear delivery vehicles in Central Europe and of additional Soviet SS‐20 IRBMs; (3) use this "breathing space" to seek agreement on the limitation of cruise missiles, MR/IRBMs and other "gray area" weapons in the region "from the Atlantic to the Urals."
The arguments against nuclear proliferation are numerous and weighty. Further proliferation may increase the likelihood of nuclear war through accident, nuclear black mail, or escalation of conflicts. Conversely, there are reasons for leaders to support their countries' right to acquire nuclear weapons for security, power status, or economic benefits. It is very likely that additional states will seek to produce nuclear weapons, and the technical information and expertise to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive devise are readily available. Problems of safeguarding nuclear facilities from nuclear diversion and sabotage and theft by terrorists are reasons for curbing nuclear proliferation and searching for ways to reduce incentives to proliferation both through responsible behavior by present nuclear powers and through the UN and international organizations. However, problems of organizational structure and decision-making processes will confront both nations and international organizations. Judgments as to the best way to slow, channel, and limit proliferation differ markedly; however, five suggestions are: (1) the promotion of détente; (2) amelioration of differences likely to induce proliferation, (3) establishment of policies to inhibit acquisition of nuclear energy systems by additional nations while offering alternatives; (4) application of economic sanctions against detonation of nuclear devices; and (5) a greater willingness to accord status to countries on the basis of factors other than nuclear capabilities.
